Iran Models Deception Strategy after Iraq’s

December 12, 2007

As Aristotle said, “All men desire by nature to know.” Understanding the capability and intent of Iran in the midst of reports and speculation that it is developing nuclear capability is crucial- especially in the wake of perceived poor intelligence pertaining to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq.


What happened to Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction heralded by President Bush in the months preluding the invasion of Iraq? Critics posit that the weapons never existed, that the administration’s claims were based on flawed intelligence reports or that the assertion of an Iraqi WMD program was simply a ploy to justify the removal of Saddam Hussein. Others claim that President George W. Bush outright lied to the American people or that he was duped by sly Washington bureaucrats. The mass media has taken every opportunity to embarrass the administration and continue to assert that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after Operation Desert Storm.

Despite the allegations to the contrary, Saddam did indeed have a WMD program and stockpiles of weapons, Saddam simply moved them, as he had moved other weaponry in times past, prior to the invasion to avoid discovery.[1] During the months leading up to the US led offensive into Iraq, Iran was more than a passive observer; Iranian leadership understood the depth of Saddam’s WMD program and learned how Iraqis deceived and hid the weapons from investigators. Because Iran is facing a similar situation as pre-war Iraq, Iran’s leaders will formulate stratagems to conceal and remove their WMD, based on their observations during the months leading up to the assault on its neighbor, until their stockpile is sufficient. Iran is following the example of the former Saddam regime, developing a clandestine WMD program and, if the US attacks before Iran’s WMD arsenal is complete, Iranian leadership will attempt to move the WMD and missiles out of the country or hide them, just as Iraq successfully transferred its WMD out of country immediately prior to the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and pre-war Iraq mirror each other on myriad levels. Iran, since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, has engaged in developing its nuclear program as well as other WMD programs designed to deter regional aggression and aid in any military operations Iran may participate in. The buildup of Iran’s WMD program was spurred, in part, by Saddam’s deployment of chemical and biological weapons against Iranian troops during the clash between the two nations that began in 1980.[2] In an effort to prevent another such WMD massacre against his people, Ayatollah Khomeini renewed the previously American-backed nuclear program in Esfahan and began developing Iran’s own chemical and biological weapons and delivery systems. Iran’s WMD programs paralleled Iraq’s, both nations building chemical depots as well as nuclear weapon facilities. A limited, bi-national, arms race ensued; never again would Iran allow the scales of war to be tipped in favor of Iraq.

Iranian leadership learned an important lesson from its Iraqi neighbor; just as Iran was beginning to develop its weapons programs, Saddam was nearing completion on the Osirak nuclear facility. Saddam’s nuclear program was dealt a major blow when Israeli fighter planes bombed the nuclear reactor facility. Desiring to avoid a similar attack that would cripple the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian leadership determined not consolidate the nuclear reactors, as Iraq had; that was a risk Iranian leadership was not willing to take. Iran’s leaders distributed nuclear efforts over 25 different sites throughout the vast nation. Hoping to decrease the vulnerability of its WMD program to foreign attack by creating multiple nuclear facilities, the Iranians built several WMD facilities underground. Iran would continue to learn from the experiences of its hostile neighbor beginning with the Iran-Iraq War up to Operation Iraq Freedom.

Saddam has a history of trying to protect his military hardware by hiding equipment in neighboring countries. On the eve of Desert Storm, Saddam realized that an American attack was eminent; he knew that American strategy involves gaining air superiority. In an effort to protect the outnumbered Iraqi air force, Saddam appealed to Iran to harbor its newly acquired Russian Mig-29s until the initial fighting had ended. This effort to hide weapons was Saddam’s first experience in attempting to protect his order of battle by asking another nation to temporarily protect it. Unfortunately, memories of the Iran-Iraq War were still fresh in the Iranian leadership’s minds; Iran had no intention of returning the planes. The Iranian Air Force, in dire need of new fighters, confiscated the Mig-29s as reparations for the war and left Iraq with nothing but destroyed aircraft in the wake of American bombers in the Gulf War.
After Desert Storm, the U.N. directed several weapons-related resolutions toward Iraq; similar U.N. resolutions are presently directed at Iran. The resolutions specify that Iraq, and Iran, should provide full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and long-range missile weapons programs. The declarations allow unconditional inspection access by international monitors and that Iraq should have ceased and Iran should cease any attempt to hide, move or destroy any material or equipment related to these programs; and cooperate with U.N. monitoring of relevant facilities and trade activities. Saddam did just the opposite, complying with none of these stipulations.

Iran has been following suite, failing to disclose nuclear facilities and weapons deals with foreign nations, all the while, claiming compliance with the U.N. mandates and complaining against unfair embargos. In January 2004, Mohammad Khatami, Iranian President, said, “Iran has never been after weapons of mass destruction.”[3] Yet, just four months earlier to this statement, and again in 2006, the IAEA found particles of highly enriched uranium in environmental samples taken at the Natanz nuclear facility that Iranian leadership concealed from IAEA inspectors.[4] Iranian leadership took queues from Saddam, learning how to play the cat and mouse game of hiding weapons and misleading weapons inspectors. For over a decade Saddam successfully delayed discovery and exposure; provided improved tactics coupled with a similar strategy, Iranian strategists may be able to deceive and delay discovery for even longer.
Iraqi agents operating under Saddam’s guidance deceived inspectors and Iranian elements continue to elude International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors by controlling and manipulating the environment in which the officers charged with monitoring nuclear and other WMD materials. The Special Commission on Iraq inspection team, created in 1991, disbanded after interruptions, confrontations, and Iraqi attempts at denial, deception and non-cooperation on December 16, 1998. After the original inspection team dissolved, the U.N. created a more robust inspection program carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission and the IAEA. Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision and inspections resumed in late November 2002.[5] The four-year interlude, interspersed with periods of non-inspection, provided ample time for Saddam and his cronies to hide and disperse the weapons programs.

Similarly, Iran has had opportunity to elude inspectors. Despite Iranian leadership’s best efforts, IAEA inspectors discovered traces of highly enriched uranium at two sites, which Iranian officials have maintained was due to contaminated imported materials- materials which include 160 new centrifuges- key equipment for the development of nuclear weapons- imported from either Pakistan or North Korea.[6] Moving WMD materials underground in an effort to elude inspectors was first undertaken by Saddam’s regime and discovered when precursor nerve agents were found by U.S. troops in Karbala in 55-gallon drums in camouflaged bunkers six feet underground. Iranian efforts have mimicked Saddam’s efforts in going underground as well, burying at least four WMD related sites in sites across Iran.[7] Additionally, since the discovery of the secret Natanz reactor site, multiple air defense platforms including SAM and AAA batteries have been installed with the most liberal shoot-on-sight authorization since the end of the Iran-Iraq war ended; apparently, Iranian leadership wants to avoid Saddam’s experience with the Osirak reactor.

Finally, after years of frustration in dealing with the oppressive regime, US President Bush addressed Saddam directly, claiming that unless he complied with U.N. directives, action would be taken to remove Saddam and the weapons he was hiding. Convinced President George W. Bush was serious, Saddam rebuilt the Syrian-Iraq-Iran rail road- which was destroyed in the previous Gulf War. The rebuilding of the railroad was undertaken, in part, to facilitate the removal of WMD from Mosul into Iraq or Iran.

In the event that war was not declared against Iraq, the railroad could be used to allow Iranian troops to easily enter Syria to engage the Israelis in battle. The railroad was not the only alleged means of transporting WMD out of the nation; commercial airlines and private vehicles were likely modes utilized by Iraqi leaders tasked with removing evidence of WMD. These methods of hiding weapons in other nations are congruent with Saddam’s previous tactics of hiding fighter aircraft in Iran.

Many authoritative sources, both before and after the US-led invasion of Iraq ascertained evidence of Iraqi WMD being transported into Syria and Lebanon. Dr. David Kay, the former head of the Iraq Survey Group, believed there was substantiation that unspecified materials had been moved to Syria abruptly before the start of the recent war to overthrow Saddam.[8] While doubt remains as to exactly what those unspecified Iraqi shipments included, there is little doubt that Saddam did transport some, if not all, his WMD to Syria and other nations before the war.

Dr. Kay is not alone in his convictions; the 2001-2006 director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly NIMA) confirmed that satellite images showed a significant flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria just before the American invasion in March 2003. The director, Retired Air Force Lieutenant General James Clapper Jr., said he believed "unquestionably" that illicit weapons material was transported into Syria and perhaps other countries and private weapons dealers.[9] Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense John A. Shaw posits that the Russians actually assisted the Iraqis in moving materials into Syria.[10] While many of the earlier speculations that the removal of weapons was Israeli disinformation, the presence of multiple sources and evidences acquired through various means, supports the conjecture of the Iraqi transference of weapons.
If the US were to stage an attack on Iran, Iranian leadership would be faced with few defensive options. Most military planners agree that a limited strike poses the least amount of risk to the US; however, the benefits of a limited air strike against hardened targets would only set the Iranian nuclear program back a few years- hardly justifying the expenditure of billions of dollars in operations to destroy what could easily be rebuilt.[11] Other planners say that a complete overthrow of the Islamic government is needed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons; however, the risks involved to US troops during an occupation increases dramatically as evidenced in Iraq. Iranian leadership would attempt to defend the core nuclear and military targets, but would quickly be militarily overwhelmed. Politically however, if evidence of weapons could be hidden from the media’s view; the United States would suffer embarrassment, much as it did when Iraqi WMD caches were not found as the media expected.

In the case of a limited air attack, Iranian leadership would follow Saddam’s example and attempt to hide and export evidence of WMD and manipulate the media through various forms of propaganda. Because a limited air strike would only attack military air defenses and suspected nuclear weapons related facilities, Iranian leadership would still be in control of its nation’s media outlets. They could show “proof”, however doctored and manipulated, that the Americans were incorrect, once again, and that the US wrongly attacked a peaceful nation seeking only nuclear power for energy. Iranian leadership would likely show, and broadcast on national television for months, the damages caused by US bombs to the civilian population- whether there were damages to civilians or not. Shortly after an air attack, the evidence of WMD could be hidden from the cameras; meanwhile facilities would secretly be rebuilt.

Iranian leadership is practiced in the art of deception; influencing the perceptions of the masses through the nationally-controlled media. In following the Iraqi pattern, U.N. investigators would only be shown evidence that supports the Iranian cause; delays would prevent inspections while clean-up crews remove evidence and doctor the scene of attack. Investigators may incorrectly report that there is no evidence of a WMD program. The potential for the US to be embarrassed in the wake of any attack is high, considering the role mass media plays in forming political opinion and that the Iranian government can control most forms of information emanating from its borders.

In the event that a full US land invasion followed air strikes, the Islamic Republic of Iran would still have ample time to remove weapons and evidences of weapons long before any US troops arrived to investigate. Unlike the direct overland route US troops took to Baghdad from Kuwait, no easy route exists toward Tehran. Mountain ranges guard the Eastern border and Western borders. The North is bordered by the Caspian Sea, and the South is bordered by the marshy northern coast of the Persian Gulf; inland, canyons and natural barriers circumference the region, which would delay any Southern invasion from reaching the myriad suspected nuclear and chemical weapons locations located in the North. Meanwhile, because Iranian leadership has close relationships with Pakistan, Russia and North Korea, they could easily transport and dispose of evidence pointing to WMD capabilities and ambitions or hide them in the two mountain ranges within the country.

As mentioned previously, Iranian leadership models its WMD program after programs in the former government of Iraq. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in which Saddam’s arsenal was severely crippled, efforts to rebuild the railroad linking Syria to Baghdad became a priority. Ironically, about the same time, Iran embarked on a railway expansion program; the Kerman-Bam-Zahedan railroad project that would link Iran to Pakistan. Iran has had ties with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Further implicating the sinister nature of the project, the Iranian railway developments are financially non-viable. The Iranian Railway Company states that it costs 18,000 Iranian rials for each passenger while the tickets sold by it for second class, first class and deluxe compartments are only 5,000; 10,000 and 16,000 rials respectively.[12] The government of Iran is subsidizing the railway’s construction and operation for a reason other than commerce- could it be that they have built an escape hatch with which to quickly and quietly remove its weapons in case of emergency? If Iran’s leadership is indeed following Saddam’s model for hiding weapons in neighboring nations, the answer is a resounding “yes.”

The question of timing is paramount in determining what Iranian leadership will opt to do in the event of an attack. If an attack does not occur for several more years, Iran may be able to develop its weapons systems sufficiently to ward off an attack by threatening reprisal if attacked. Once Iran reaches nuclear weapon capability, given their propensity to brag and exaggerate its military capabilities, the Iranian leaders will probably announce their nuclear weapon competence, first as a point of national pride and second as a deterrent to the United States and other nations that do not desire a nuclear Iran.

Once Iran does reach a certain level of nuclear weapon capability, disarming Iran of that capability becomes much more challenging and hazardous. If the U.N. or any of its members attack Iran after it has acquired nuclear weapons, Iran is likely to retaliate with its atomic powers- assuming the weapons are not all destroyed. However, in the aftermath of a surprise attack where all of the weapons and delivery systems are incapacitated, Iran may revert to the strategy aforementioned and seek to covertly export any nuclear evidence.

Iranian strategists may believe that the United States choose to attack Iraq, in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, at the moments it did because US military leaders surmised that Iraq was not yet at the critical level of being able to launch a successful counter attack. If the United States had underestimated the capabilities of the Iraqi military, Saddam might have ordered a WMD or conventional attack on Israel or Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. However, due to the inchoate nature of the Iraqi military and its WMD delivery systems, such retaliation against its US-allied neighbors was unlikely.

Because Iran has assimilated Iraqi strategy and tactics into its own military and weapons development programs- and learned from Iraqi mistakes- Iranian leadership may surmise that the United States will only attack a nation that does not have nuclear weapon capability. Iranian intelligence officers may support this analysis by observing that the United States has not attacked North Korea or any other nation which has declared that it has nuclear weapons. Based on this conjecture, Iran’s leaders may be inclined to prematurely declare its nuclear weapon consummation in an attempt to dissuade aggressors from a pre-emptive strike against Iran.

Iranian leaders have long asserted its military capabilities before acquiring them. In 2006 Iran released a video which showed a missile launching from a Kilo class submarine; shortly after it aired on Iranian public television, Pentagon officials countered saying that the video was a fake created from an earlier video China produced of its own submarine-based missile launch.[13] Considering recent events where the Iranian Air Force showcased a “new fighter” supposedly of indigenous origins- which is obviously a poorly reversed- engineered copy of an early 1970s era Northrop Grumman-produced F-5E Tiger II.[14] Iran is eager to show its home-made military hardware and boast of its capabilities, even when the claims are observably concocted. In a similar manner, Iranian leadership may announce that its homegrown nuclear arsenal is complete months or years before Iranian nuclear physicists actually create a viable nuclear weapon or even conduct a nuclear test.

Iranian strategy mirrors Iraqi strategy when successful and applies lessons learned when not. Besides sharing a common religion with Saddam, the Iranian national and military leadership has been attempting to develop a force to rival its former neighbor in the event of a second Iran-Iraq War. It should come as no surprise to discover that Iran has a weapons program that surpassed Saddam’s- due to the setbacks the Iraqi WMD programs faced in the wake of the Israeli Osirak attack and Operation Desert Storm.

Further, Iran has received guidance and WMD production materials from Pakistan, a nation that has already achieved nuclear weapon status. Iran continues to collaborate with Russian and French scientists who undoubtedly lend their nuclear expertise in conjunction with North Korea medium to long range missile programs. Iran has had the benefit of learning through others mistakes and successes, all the while, until recently, maintaining a relatively small presence in the Gulf. Iranians strategists have had an up-close and personal opportunity to learn from the experiences of the former Iraqi regime and ascertain US attack capabilities. Armed with that information, Iranian leaders are better prepared to thwart and deceive U.N. investigations and US forces designed to prevent Iran from acquiring WMD.

Has the nuclear situation in Iran reached the point of no return? Will Iran’s leadership acquiesce to U.N. demands? Can war with Iran be averted? How will the world react to a war with Iran? Will the United States lead an attack on Iran or will Israel beat them to the punch? Will Iran strike Israel first? What will happen to the price of oil? How many people will die? Will the form of government in Iran change? Does Iran really have nuclear weapon ambitions? How long before Iran acquires nuclear capability if its leaders do have nuclear weapon ambitions? How will a war with Iran affect the American way of life? Will there be more terrorist attacks if the US provokes Iran.

These questions and more occupy the minds of world leaders and politicians, analysts, and citizens alike. As Iran continues to enrich fissile material and develop its missile systems, the U.N.’s demands of Iran have gone unheeded. If national and terrorist actors continue along their current path, military action against Iran is likely. Iran will continue on its quest for nuclear weapons and will employ every mode of deception available to increase the likelihood of that achievement.

Iranian leadership will follow the historical example of Saddam Hussein’s deceitful strategy and attempt to persuade IAEA and U.N. investigators that no such weapon system exists. Concurrently, Iran’s leaders will prepare for worst-case scenarios, developing exit strategies via railways and other means including hiding the weapons in the various mountain ranges within Iran. Moreover, Iran will likely manipulate the media in the event of any preemptive attack, and attempt to show they did not actually have nuclear or WMD in an effort to embarrass the attacker. Armed with this knowledge and conjectures, US military and political leaders are better prepared to intercept weapons that may be covertly shipped out of Iran. Additionally, by understanding that the Iranian leadership will mount a deceptive media campaign to embarrass the United States in the event of an attack, US leaders are more prepared to handle potential Iranian propaganda and political fallout.

Bibliography

Baker, Peter; Linzer; Dafna and Ricks, Thomas E. “U.S. Is Studying Military Strike Options on Iran?,” Washingtonpost.com. April 9, 2006. Available online. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/08/AR2006040801082_pf.html

Barnes, Julian E. “Video of Iran's Test Missile Called Fake,” Los Angeles Times. Sunday, September 10, 2006.

“Natanz,” Global Security.org, accessed online 21 November 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/natanz.htm

Griffith, Samuel. Sun Tsu: The Art of War. Oxford University Press, 1963.

“Iran FM,” Tape number: EF04/0611. Associated Press. 12 June 2004. Manuscript available online, accessed 21 November 2007. http://www.aparchive.com/user/GetOneUp.aspx?id=419827&links=JUNE,12,2004,USABL&media=Text

“Iranian Rail History” Sana't-E-Haml-O-Naghl, Transport & Industry. May 1995, Vol. 14, No. 138, Pages: 34-39.

“Iran's New Saegheh Fighter Enters Service,” Defense Industry Daily. 23 Sep 2007. Article available online: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/irans-new-saegheh-fighter-enters-service-02596/

Johnston, Robert. “Iran: WMD-Related Facilities,” accessed online 21 November 2007. http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/iranmap.html

“Medical Expert Reports Use of Chemical Weapons in Iran-Iraq War,” U.N. Chronicle. May, 1985. Accessed online 18 November 2007. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_v22/ai_3752725

“Nuclear Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed Online November 20, 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/nuke.htm

Squassoni, Sharon A. “Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Congressional Research Service. October 7, 2003.

Timmerman, Kenneth R. “Ex-Official: Russia Moved Saddam’s WMD,” Newsmax.com. Feb 19, 2006. http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/2/18/233023.shtml


[1] This essay will not attempt to prove that WMD did exist in Iraq but will operate under the understanding that WMD did exist. For more exhaustive evidence to support the claim that WMD did exist in Iraq prior to the US-led invasion, please see the article written by Kenneth R. Timmerman and published by WorldNetDaily entitled “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Saddam’s WMD Have Been Found New Evidence Unveils Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Ballistic Arms,” WorldNetDaily.com April 26th 2004. Available online: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38213
[2] “Medical Expert Reports Use of Chemical Weapons in Iran-Iraq War,” U.N. Chronicle. May, 1985. accessed online 18 November 2007: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_v22/ai_3752725
[3] “Iran FM,” Tape number: EF04/0611. Associated Press. 12 June 2004. Manuscript available online, accessed 21 November 2007. http://www.aparchive.com/user/GetOneUp.aspx?id=419827&links=JUNE,12,2004,USABL&media=Text
[4] Sciolino, Elaine “Highly Enriched Uranium Found at Iranian Plant,” New York Times. September 1, 2006. Accessed Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/01/world/middleeast/01vienna.html
[5] Sharon A. Squassoni. “Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Congressional Research Service. October 7, 2003. pp. 13-14.
[6] “Natanz,” Global Security.org. Accessed online 21 November 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/natanz.htm
[7] Robert Johnston. “Iran: WMD-Related Facilities,” Accessed Online 21 November 2007. http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/iranmap.html
[8] In an interview with The Sunday Telegraph published on January 25, 2004, Dr. David Kay said, "We are not talking about a large stockpile of weapons. But we know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program. Precisely what went to Syria, and what has happened to it, is a major issue that needs to be resolved." Complete article entitled “Nuclear Weapons” available online from GlobalSecurity.org, accessed November 20, 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/nuke.htm
[9] "I think people below the Saddam- Hussein-and-his-sons level saw what was coming and decided the best thing to do was to destroy and disperse. ... I think probably in the few months running up to the onset of the conflict, I think there was probably an intensive effort to disperse into private hands, to bury it, and to move it outside the country's borders.” Complete article entitled “Nuclear Weapons” available online from GlobalSecurity.ORG, accessed 21 November 2007. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/nuke.htm
[10] Timmerman, Kenneth R. “Ex-Official: Russia Moved Saddam’s WMD,” Newsmax.com. Feb 19, 2006. http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/2/18/233023.shtml
[11] Peter Baker, Dafna Linzer and Thomas E. Ricks. “U.S. Is Studying Military Strike Options on Iran,” Washingtonpost.com. April 9, 2006. Available online. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/08/AR2006040801082_pf.html
[12] “Iranian Rail History” Sana't-E-Haml-O-Naghl, Transport & Industry. (Monthly) May 1995, Vol. 14, No. 138, Pages: 34-39.
[13] Julian E. Barnes. “Video of Iran's Test Missile Called Fake”, Los Angeles Times. Sunday, September 10, 2006.

[14] “Iran's New Saegheh Fighter Enters Service,” Defense Industry Daily. 23-Sep-2007. Article available online: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/irans-new-saegheh-fighter-enters-service-02596/