Introduction
The FBI has responded to these criticisms and has taken steps to develop a more dynamic organization, better able to meet the demands of the 21st Century. They are attempting to develop the Counter Terrorist Division into an intelligence division able to prevent terrorist attacks, rather than a reactionary, law enforcement one. The main objectives undertaken by the FBI include intelligence structural reorganization, a communication and computer network overhaul, and management retraining.[iii]
Reactions to the FBI’s recent changes are muddled. Opponents say that due to the law enforcement background and history of the FBI, they will have difficulty adapting to the new role of an intelligence organization. Essentially, they argue that the reforms are too limited and will not enable the FBI to succeed in transforming the traditionally reactionary culture to that of a forecasting one. Various reform actions are currently under consideration by Congress. FBI critics hope that those selected will create a stronger Intelligence community, able to defend the
Proponents defy the naysayers and declare that the steps taken by the FBI’s Director are sufficient and appropriate to transform the FBI into a terrorist-fighting organization. They argue that the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence is a synergistic one and that the FBI can overcome its intelligence related shortcomings. They believe that the FBI is unique in the Intelligence Community because they are the only agency with unmatched law enforcement abilities and can effectively deal with terrorists on
In consideration of the current changes within the FBI, this paper will analyze popular FBI intelligence reform options, and discover which of those, if any, should be implemented in order to combat the domestic terrorist threat, collect useful intelligence, analyze strategic intelligence, and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. This paper will not address shortcomings or reforms concerning other members of the Intelligence Community and will focus only on FBI recommendations currently and recently considered by Congress. It employs a qualitative approach by revealing the nature of the issues surrounding FBI intelligence reform. The paper will help the reader gain new insights concerning the task of reform and discover problems that exist when doing so. It then will test the validity of reform options and provide a framework for effective evaluation for reform.
During the course of preparation for this paper, a case study was incorporated in order to make comparisons and understand generalizations in reform. Extensive data was reviewed from various sources including scholarly books, Congressional interviews, budget reviews, personal interviews, and third party investigations regarding the FBI. Discussing details regarding the FBI’s history and social factors, the essay seeks to create a comprehensive outline with which to analyze the various plans for reform.
Review of Literature
The following scholarly works greatly influenced the creation of this paper. Although not a bibliography, references to these literary works are made throughout this essay. This review is included to show the main themes, biases, strengths, and weaknesses of each. Though not inclusive of all the works cited within this paper, they represent a portion of the sources accessed in preparation of this essay.
Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure
Retired General William Odom’s Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America is referenced several times in this paper. Odom has received criticism for his wide-reaching ideas regarding intelligence reform. His plan involves the restructuring of the entire intelligence community, separating each of the main intelligence disciplines. A former Director of the National Security Agency, he brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to the table. However, a former military man, he does not hide his biases against the CIA or FBI. Despite his shortcomings, Odom delivers an opposing point of view worth considering.
FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, 2004
Intelligence experts Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse unite to write an eye opening scholarly essay chiefly addressing changes within FBI since the attacks of 9/11. Their report is pleasantly to the point, but does not fully address the faults of the FBI. In their attempt to create a picture of the situation, they often gloss over highly criticized issues, portraying the FBI in a clearly positive viewpoint. Cummings and Masse, however identify underlying themes in reform: those who think the FBI can become an intelligence agency and those who do not. On balance, the essay presents an important perspective in comprehending FBI reform.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, Office of the Inspector General, 2003
This report was generated to reflect the findings of the OIG’s 2002-2003 audit of the FBI. The audit focused primarily on information sharing and dissemination as well as the computer architecture required to perform those functions. This audit is somewhat outdated, yet still delivers insight regarding the development of the communication systems of the FBI. The authors are especially critical of the FBI and the language carries a sarcastic tone, almost poking fun at the shortcomings. The bias is not overly apparent however, and the report is often dry as details are discussed. The redacted report contains an enormous amount of information and remains a great point of reference.
FBI History and Counterterrorism Authority
In order to determine if the FBI should be reformed, one must understand the history and culture of the FBI before the events of September 11, 2001. The following is an excerpt from the FBI’s website:
The FBI originated from a force of Special Agents created in 1908 by Attorney General Charles Bonaparte during the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. The two men first met when they both spoke at a meeting of the Baltimore Civil Service Reform Association. Roosevelt, then Civil Service Commissioner, boasted of his reforms in federal law enforcement. It was 1892, a time when law enforcement was often political rather than professional.
The FBI clearly has its roots in law enforcement and continues to be the premier Federal law enforcement agency in the
The Bureau’s authorities in counterterrorism originate from legislation and from several National Security Directives and Presidential Decision Directives. The Attorney General is sanctioned to employ officials “to detect and prosecute crimes against the
The FBI’s historic expertise has been in crime-fighting and in building cases for prosecution of criminals. Refocusing the FBI to prevent terrorist acts and develop the sets of skills required to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence strategically as well as tactically has required a change in the FBI’s culture that has not been easy or quick and will probably continue to be a struggle for years to come.
According to the Lexington Institute, the initial response of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to September 11 was, simply put, remarkable. Director Robert Mueller instantly embarked to transform the FBI. The Bureau’s counterterrorism program was restructured. Fifty-six Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) were established, one in each of the FBI’s field offices. Resources have been and are being transferred from traditional criminal investigative programs into the counterterrorism program, enlarging the domestic intelligence operations of the FBI. A multi-year effort is underway to improve the FBI’s antiquated computer systems and to allow for the integration of databases currently employed in other government departments and agencies.[x] Critics of Director Mueller’s actions claim that the directives are superficial. They claim that a new Director cannot simply waive a wand and change an organization with over a hundred years of law enforcement experience into an intelligence organization.
JIC Criticisms and the FBI’s Response
In February 2002, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence decided to perform a Joint Inquiry into the actions of the U.S. Intelligence Community in relation to the terrorist attacks committed against the
The JIC Inquiry, concluded the FBI failed to:
- Focus on the domestic threat. "The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other international terrorist groups operating in the
- Conduct all-source analysis. “... The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies."[xii]
- Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. “... The FBI's 56 field offices enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility apparently served to dilute the FBI's national focus on Bin Laden and al-Qaida."[xiii]
- Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. "Consistent with its traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was, before September 11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization that did not value strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers) viewed strategic analytical products as academic and of little use in ongoing operations." [xiv]
- Develop effective information technology systems. The FBI relied upon "... outdated and insufficient technical systems...."[xv]
In written testimony for the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 2002, the Director acknowledged the FBI’s shortcomings and offered explanation of the recent changes within the Bureau:
A significant restructuring and expansion of the Counterterrorism Division at FBI headquarters is being proposed for three basic reasons. First, the more direct role envisioned for the Counterterrorism Division in managing investigations, providing operational support to field offices, and collaboration with law enforcement and the Intelligence Community partners requires additional staff at Headquarters. Second, implementing a more proactive approach to preventing terrorist acts and denying terrorists groups the ability to operate and raise funds requires a centralized and robust analytical capacity that does not exist in the present Counterterrorism Division. Third, processing and exploiting the information gathered domestically and from abroad during the course of the [Pentagon-Trade Towers Bombing Investigation] and related investigation requires an enhanced analytical and data mining capacity that is not presently available.
The FBI is reacting to the shortcomings delineated by the JIC by aspiring to transform itself into an agency that can thwart terrorist acts, rather than react to them as criminal acts. The major component of this effort is the restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to reduce the independence of the organization's 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases.[xvi]
According to one source, this is actually a weakness of the current changes being implemented by the FBI. The FBI is trying to model itself after the CIA. CIA headquarters serves as a central repository of information on all activities conducted and intelligence collected in the field. Headquarters serves as a value added – providing the big picture – making sure operations are not tripping over each other, providing the tools needed to be effective in the field. Although information is centralized at CIA headquarters, decision-making is not. CIA headquarters does not control operations that control and decision-making authority is left in the field to station chiefs who are closest to the operations and are in the best position to make decisions related to the operation. Critics complain that the FBI has taken headquarters control to the extreme. Instead of serving as a value-added, FBI headquarters is literally seeking to control every activity and operation, removing the authority to conduct investigations and operations from the field offices. Critics contend that there is certainly much to be gained by FBI headquarters coordinating, for that matter even knowing, what the various independent field offices are doing. They contend that taking it to the extreme and controlling their activities, however, serves only to bureaucratize and slow down the system – and cause many decisions to be faulty because the decision-makers are now too removed from the actual activity.[xvii]
FBI Efforts to Remedy Shortcomings
Clearly, the FBI recognizes the need for improvements and, with the acknowledgment and efforts of the Director and other senior leadership, the FBI has begun to take steps to correct its shortcomings. The creation of a new mission statement and revamping of priorities has set the stage for change within the Bureau. Structural changes have helped to strengthen the chain of command and flow of information internally. The FBI has also begun to streamline its intelligence divisions by conforming to a proven pattern (known as the intelligence cycle) followed throughout the Intelligence Community. The intelligence cycle, previously ignored by the FBI, is now being implemented, with resources provided at all levels of the process. The FBI is making strides to integrate its out-dated computer databases and networks with those systems other members of the Intelligence Community. These improvements are either currently implemented or are in the process of being put into practice with the goal of eliminating the shortfalls of the FBI and optimally positioning the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats.[xviii]
Critical observers have noted that the FBI still lacks a sufficient number of experienced intelligence officers; they note that the current analysts are utilized in administrative roles, rather than an analytical one. Additionally, the FBI has augmented its intelligence tradecraft training from zero hours to about eight within the special agents training program. Critics argue that FBI officers receive insufficient training to successfully conduct clandestine, offensive, proactive intelligence operations. Contrasting the FBI training with the year plus CIA officers receive in tradecraft identifies a lack of training, results of which will be evident in the quality of work.
Information technology deficiencies have been the cause of many of the FBI failures. Before 9/11, the FBI lacked a secure network for transferring Top Secret data into or out of its own LAN. The FBI’s former database, known as Automated Case Support (ACS), was rated to hold information only up to the Secret level. Additionally, its network connecting to the CIA was not fiber optic. Because of the out-dated computer infrastructure, information stagnated within individual departments, requiring Top Secret intelligence to be delivered via courier. The FBI has since taken steps to remedy these problems and others by hiring IT professionals from outside the FBI. [xix] They have developed a Top Secret network that is connected to all the other members of the intelligence community. They have a presence on SIPRNET and have access to INTELINK as well as NSA NET. These TOP SECRET//SCI (sensitive compartmented information) level networks now enable the FBI to interact with analysts throughout the entire intelligence community, greatly magnifying the resources of the
These advances have not developed without incident however. Recently, the FBI underestimated the computer infrastructure budget by 80 million dollars and continues to receive intense criticism. According to a higher-level intelligence manager, “They are at least a couple of years and a lot of money from having a truly robust communications system. The current system is literally the butt of jokes of every [FBI] special agent I have ever met or worked with.”[xx]
Due to the FBI’s increased ability to communicate via Top Secret networks, its analysts have been able to work with a cadre of professional intelligence analysts and CIA officers at the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF). This arrangement serves to foster cooperation and sharing of intelligence between the CIA and FBI. The FBI is continuing to hire and train large numbers of intelligence analysts and linguists to fill the rapidly growing offices of its reorganized Counter Terrorist Division. Participation at the NJTTF and regional JTTFs helps the CIA and FBI develop better relationships and serves as a communication conduit. The Director and his senior leadership have begun to make changes to overcome the FBI’s weaknesses, establish its highest priority of deterring terrorist attacks, and seem to have improved its prior deficiencies in communication.
One of the major structural changes implemented since September 11, 2001 is the creation of the position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence. The EAD-I manages a single intelligence program across the FBI's four investigative/operational divisions: counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. The creation of this position is an effort to centralize control and standardize the intelligence methods and efforts Bureau wide. Before the current arrangement, each division was responsible for its own intelligence programs. The EAD-I, among other things, is also responsible for creating a strategic intelligence plan and its execution. The Director has also created the Office of Intelligence (run by the EAD-I) as well as new Field Office Intelligence Groups. These innovative entities and positions act to direct the FBI’s intelligence collection effort within each of the 56 field offices as well as in the new Joint Terrorism Task Force.[xxi]
The EAD-I has introduced and mandated use of the intelligence cycle. Intelligence operations can be divided into a predetermined set of functions. The FBI has accepted the long-standing process used throughout the intelligence community and has aligned itself better with the rest of the intelligence community. This will help with the exchange of ideas and information, ensuring interchangeability and common understanding among analysts. Congruency among the Intelligence Community enables the easy flow of information across the computer networks as well.
The 2006 Budget supports the FBI’s priorities and intelligence reform by providing new funding of $294 million for counterterrorism and counterintelligence initiatives, and $117 million to bolster the intelligence program. According to the Department of Justice, these funding initiatives will:
· Increase the resources and agents dedicated to terrorism investigations.
· Double the size of the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team.
· Hire 500 additional intelligence analysts to assist in the war on terrorism.
· Add $75 million for the
· Increase the Foreign Language Program by $26 million to enhance the FBI’s language translation capability, especially for anti-terrorism efforts.
· Expand the Legal Attaché program to augment the FBI’s presence in other countries, especially for counterterrorism efforts. [xxii]
These potentially effective changes, infused with monetary and management resources, represent the Director’s efforts to establish and standardize all FBI intelligence related functions to match those within the Intelligence Community. These changes, however, may be for naught if the FBI does not institute an effective training program to teach their officers how to be intelligence officers instead of law enforcement officers.
The unifying of FBI command and integrating computer and intelligence functions aim to streamline the FBI into a true intelligence-gathering machine, able to assimilate and work efficiently with other Intelligence Community members in the process. Conversely, it may be argued that the FBI has over-centralized command, paralyzing decision making of the intelligence officers within the 56 field offices.
External Recommendations for Change
Despite the best efforts of the FBI to update the computer networks, overhaul its Intelligence Department, obtain additional resources, and communicate better with the CIA and others in the Intelligence Community, opponents claim the attempts are not enough. They argue that history is working against the FBI and, despite their best efforts to change, they will never fully embrace the intelligence philosophy. Others ask if the FBI has improved its communication systems sufficiently and whether centralizing the intelligence division is really the solution. Critics dispute that simply hiring additional analysts will not fix the FBI’s problems. They claim that the FBI is merely pulling analysts from other agencies and will hurt the system overall. For these reasons and more, skeptics have begun calling for major reforms.
Reform Plan #1 Create a New Independent Intelligence Agency
Proponents of this plan claim that the creation of a new agency, independent of the CIA, FBI and DHS, and responsible for counterintelligence, is the solution to prevent future terrorist attacks in the
There are many differing versions of this reform plan. Some call for a new agency to encompass all counterintelligence, both foreign and domestic, [xxiv]and others appeal for an agency focusing solely on domestic cases.[xxv] Either version of this reform plan recommends removing the intelligence functions and personnel from the FBI and placing them into this new agency. The agency would lack arrest authority, but would provide actionable intelligence to the Justice Department or DoD as appropriate. Another version of this plan envisions this new agency dealing strictly with national and worldwide counter-terrorism concurrently.
Although varying strategies exist for creating a new intelligence agency and defining its roles, a common idea runs throughout: the FBI should not involve themselves directly with intelligence collection. Proponents of this option are fearful that providing the FBI with an intelligence arm will create a secret police and they express doubts that the FBI will not be able to shirk the law enforcement ethos and become intelligence oriented. They seek to create a distinct separation between the two roles.[xxvi]
Opponents to this strategy claim that the FBI has never been strictly a law enforcement agency. Former Attorney General Barr testified, "An idea making the rounds these days is the notion of severing "domestic intelligence" from the FBI and creating a new domestic spy agency akin to
Many say that the FBI’s experience in breaking up the Mafia and criminal organizations is proof of their qualifications to take on terrorists. Critics of this plan maintain that terrorist cells are similar to organized criminal networks and the FBI is best suited to take on the task. They may argue that creating another agency will simply take too long to complete the new infrastructures required before it can become a competent agency.
Reform Plan #2 Allow the Department of Homeland Security to Head the National Intelligence Program
According to GAO testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives: The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security, brought together 22 diverse organizations to help prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and minimize damage and assist in recovery from attacks that do occur.[xxviii] In 2003 the senate considered a bill to create a new element of the Intelligence Community of the United States Government, within the Department of Homeland Security, whose primary mission would be the collection and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence inside the
The bill goes further to state that the mission of such entity, the Homeland Intelligence Agency, would be conducted with appropriate respect for the privacy and civil liberties of
Drawbacks to this plan are similar to that of creating a new agency. Critics of this bill argued that separating the FBI from intelligence destroy the cooperative nature of law enforcement and intelligence. Opponents point out that placing a new counterintelligence organization in the Department of Homeland Security would challenge its capacity to play the role of an honest broker that could produce intelligence products not just for the Department of Homeland Security, but for other federal agencies as well as for state and local authorities.[xxxi]
Proponents counter that this option is better than creating a stand-alone agency because it creates less bureaucracy by utilizing an agency already in existence. They argue that this plan continues to remove the law enforcement aspect from intelligence. Once the proposed Homeland Intelligence Agency establishes its Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties Protection, they argue, it may serve to better protect innocent civilians, safeguarding their rights to privacy.[xxxii]
Reform Plan #4 Allow the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to House a New Intelligence Agency
Many people, including retired General William Odom, have suggested the creation of a national director for intelligence, who would manage all members of the intelligence community. Odom’s proposal was partially fulfilled when President Bush announced that John D. Negroponte, ambassador to
According to the ODNI website: The idea of a Director of National Intelligence dates to 1955 when a blue-ribbon study commissioned by Congress recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence should employ a deputy to run the CIA so that the director could focus on coordinating the overall intelligence effort. This notion emerged as a consistent theme in many subsequent studies of the Intelligence Community commissioned by both the legislative and executive branches over the next five decades. It was the attacks of September 11, however, that finally moved forward the longstanding call for major intelligence reform and the creation of a Director of National Intelligence.[xxxiii]
Now that the ODNI has recently marked its one-year anniversary, many are calling for the Office to not only oversee the national managers of intelligence, but to collect domestic and foreign intelligence as well. The plan calls for the Attorney General to oversee the legality of the collection program, ensuring the defense of civil liberties.
Supporters of this option assert that providing the DNI additional operational capability would improve the assimilation of analysis and collection and would guarantee the emphasis of security concerns rather than criminal ones. As the primary advisor to the President, the DNI, supporters claim, should have an analysis and collection platform with which to serve the president. Again, patrons of this plan, point to the separation of law enforcement and an existing agency as benefits to enacting this reform plan.
Opponents to this plan argue that it undermines the position of the DNI, creating a scenario similar to that of the Director of Central Intelligence. If the DNI had his own platform for collection, they protest, the DNI would not be able to manage the Intelligence Community effectively and without bias. They argue that it is imperative that the DNI remain a manager and not a collector. They counter that the CIA is subordinate to the President and can serve his office directly or through the DNI. FBI fans continue to emphasize the significance of pairing law enforcement with intelligence.
Conclusion
Post September 11 investigations including the JIC’s led to wide sweeping changes throughout the Intelligence Community, including the FBI. The Director of the FBI, Robert S. Mueller, III, sworn in just days before the
Some experts contend that no matter what the FBI does, it will always fall short as an intelligence collection and analysis organization. They believe that the perceived rift between law enforcement and intelligence is too great to overcome. They categorically opt to remove major intelligence functions from the control of the FBI by enacting radical reform.
Other experts assert that the changes since 9/11 are sufficient to transform the FBI into a terrorist-fighting machine, able to defend the
It is the opinion of this author that there are many solutions to the problems related to reforming intelligence (those listed are but a few). While broad reforms and far-reaching changes may be in order, it is best to wait and observe the results of the changes currently in effect. Director Mueller, the FBI and the Justice Department have invested countless hours and millions of dollars creating the current operational, structural and philosophical Bureau that exists today. The taxpayers would be short-changed if legislators do not wait to see the results of this investment before enacting major reforms. In the mean time, on-going evaluations and assessments should continue to help make recommendations as the Bureau progresses. A final evaluation date should be set with definite benchmarks established as a criterion for success. At that point, perhaps five years from now, a decision can be made as to whether to continue to house intelligence within the FBI.
Footnotes
[i] See Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, (Hereafter cited as JIC Inquiry) p. 37.
[ii] William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (
[iii] See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director of the FBI, in U.S. Congress, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. May 2, 2006.
[iv] Alfred Cumming, Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (
[v] See FBI website at: www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/text.htm
[vi] See FBI website at: www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/wiredworld.htm
[vii] See Title 28,
[viii] See National Security Directive 207, issued in 1986.
[ix] See The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, Dec. 2003, p.1
[x] See THE STATE OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ASSESSING PROGRESS IN SECURING THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE THREAT OF TERRORISM, The Lexington Institute, September 2003 http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/docs/489.pdf
[xi] See the JIC Inquiry, p. xv.
[xii] Ibid., p. 37.
[xiii] Ibid., pp. 38-39.
[xiv] Ibid., pp. 337-338.
[xv] Ibid., p. xvi.
[xvi] Alfred Cumming, Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (
[xvii] Information collected from a source within the State Department wishing to remain anonymous.
[xviii] See FBI website at: www.fbi.gov/intelligence/intell.htm
[xix] See The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, Dec. 2003, p.13
[xx] Information collected from a source within the State Department wishing to remain anonymous.
[xxi] Alfred Cumming, Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (
[xxii] See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/justice.html
[xxiii] William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure
[xxiv] Ibid., pp. 182-183
[xxv] Alfred Cumming, Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (
[xxvi] See Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, p.44.
[xxvii] See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 18.
[xxviii] See GAO Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, May 2003
[xxix] See S. 410 S Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003 (Introduced in Senate), section two, Library of Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html
[xxx] Ibid.
[xxxi] Alfred Cumming, Todd Masse, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, (
[xxxii] See S. 410 S Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003 (Introduced in Senate), section two, Library of Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html
[xxxiii] See ODNI website http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/history.htm
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