Making Sense of Intelligence Reform Recommendations
In his latest book, Fixing Intelligence For A More Secure America, General Odom presents an innovative model for restructuring the entire
Summary of Odom’s Arguments for Reform
General Odom presents his argument for a new intelligence community by citing intelligence failures that allowed terrorists to carry out the attacks of September 11, 2001 unencumbered. Although he specifically faults turf battles between the CIA and the FBI for these failures, General Odom criticizes the intelligence community as a whole. For instance, Odom notes the failures in imagery intelligence as well as CIA blunders during Operation Desert Storm. He also discusses the Soviet/Russian penetrations of the FBI and the CIA by Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanson, respectively. Critical of previous attempts at intelligence reform, he characterizes those efforts as striking at the leaves instead of the root. He understandably places some blame on management techniques and doctrine. To remedy poor management technique, he proposes a common school for all management, so that all involved have a common set of values and a cohesive understanding of intelligence processes.
Odom advocates the creation of four collection authorities (some of which are currently in existence) the National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), National Clandestine Service (NCS) and National Counterintelligence Service (NCIS). At the head of these four agencies, he places the Director of Central Intelligence with the Collection Management Staff organizing and managing the various intelligence organizations throughout the government. In consolidating the community, he recommends disbanding portions of the FBI and CIA and dissolving the NRO, assigning the various offices and directorates to their appropriate disciplines. He advocates budget autonomy within each collection discipline, arguing that centralization of the budget gives the DCI and Collection Management Staff no way to judge the effectiveness of resource allocation. Odom proposes that national collection managers are in a better position to present a case for their respective budgets before Congress.
General Odom’s recommendations of restructuring address the current core problems and structural issues facing the
Reform Rebuttals From Dr. Richelson
Dr. Jeffery Richelson is a likely opponent to General Odom’s suggestions for intelligence reform. Richelson’s The U.S. Intelligence Community provides a comprehensive discussion of the assorted members of the intelligence community. Chapter 20 outlines popular intelligence reform options and illustrates the negative aspects of each major reform suggestion. Odom’s book was based in part on a study published in 1997 by the
Calling the community to maintain the status quo, Richelson points out that many recommendations and bills for reform have failed because they were “simply bad ideas.” Richelson identifies the foremost arguments for reform (all of which Odom recommends) and systematically identifies the weaknesses in each. He argues that internal changes are all that is required to transform the intelligence community into a cohesive group of agencies able to meet “changing world conditions and technologies.” Richelson submits that the current ad hoc intelligence community is a product of evolution and argues that the community will continue to evolve in order to meet the challenges presented by terrorism and other enemies in out technologically advanced world.
Reforms: Suggestion and Criticisms
An outline of the reforms suggested by Odom and rebuttals by Richelson offer insight into the debate on intelligence reform. Although both books are outdated in light of the newly created positions of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Secretary of Homeland Security, each author presents valid ideas and represents the opposing camps in intelligence reform. The major points of reform proposed by General Odom and the arguments against each by Richelson are summarized below.
· Establish a National Director of Intelligence, Separate From the CIA
General Odom relates that creating a Director of Central Intelligence is paramount in reforming the
Odom submits that a bureaucratic team of intelligence experts helping to organize and direct the intelligence community should support the DCI. He describes the role of the DCI as an evaluator of inputs and outputs, and a creator of community-wide policies. Odom suggests that legislators should clarify the authority of the position of the DCI as one separate from the CIA. As a true Director of Central Intelligence, he (or she) will coordinate national collection efforts, utilizing his all-encompassing view of the national intelligence picture, to direct each of the collection disciplines. Odom argues that with the DCI acting as a hub for intelligence, overlap and waste can be minimized and all the collection agencies will be on the same page. With the DCI detached from the CIA, he can serve as an impartial negotiator of important decisions within the intelligence community.
Dr. Richelson unabashedly attacks the idea of creating a national director of intelligence, calling it a “horrendously bad idea.” He clearly understands the rational of those advocating the creation of a DNI or DCI; however, he believes it is a “step backward.” Contrary to Odom’s argument that a central director could wield real power to direct the intelligence community, Richelson claims that because the position lacks collection ability, it would have less power than the Director of Central Intelligence would. He argues as an advisor to the President, the DCI should have a base of collectors and analysts with which to call upon at a moments notice. He counters calls for removing the DCI from the CIA, as Odom suggests, by arguing that adding another layer of bureaucracy will hinder the flow of information throughout the community. Richelson points out that the Director of the CIA would also lose “prestige,” making his power struggle with the FBI and other agencies even more difficult.
It is clear that the polar opposite views of Odom and Richelson leave much gray area in between. There are many points of compromise that could be reached regarding the creation of a DCI/DNI. In fact, there were. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the position of DNI and in February 2005, the President announced that John D. Negroponte would become the first Director. It is clear that the creation of the DNI has not shaken up the intelligence community as some hoped. This shake-up has not occurred for a few reasons. First, the DNI has not influenced the intelligence community greatly because the position and office is too new and has not developed its niche. The ODNI is only a little past its creation merely a year ago; certainly creating a new national level bureaucracy is difficult and time consuming. However, the DNI is successfully working with the many intelligence organizations on a personal, rather than a “chain of command” basis. Secondly, the DNI, as Richelson pointed out, lacks a real base of power. He does not have budgetary control or hire-fire authority over positions outside of his own office. With time, the office of the DNI will develop and, if given resources and authority from the President, can coordinate the various intelligence disciplines, oversee, and help direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.
· Distribute NRO Functions Between the NSA and NIMA
Odom’s recommendations for reform are based on creating accountability and managing resources. One of the problems he identifies within the intelligence community is the National Security Agency’s and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency’s (now the NGA) lack of budgetary control over satellite collection capabilities. Odom argues that because the National Resonance Office now controls large portions of the resources for signals and imagery intelligence, the NSA and NIMA are unable to control the budgetary inputs, yet, are held responsible for the outputs.
Odom recommends two strategies for providing control to the NSA and NIMA. First, divide the NRO, assigning half to the NSA and the other to NIMA. He argues that once this is done, those agencies “can prepare cost-analysis trade-off studies comparing collections systems in space against systems on the ground and atmosphere, determining the mixes of spaced-based and earth-based systems that offer lower costs.” The second strategy involves leaving the NRO intact, but requiring it to “sell” its product to the NSA or NIMA. This practice, he contends, will still allow them to develop cost effective alternatives while leaving the NRO in one piece.
Richelson shoots the idea of splitting the NRO down by quoting a former NRO Director, Keith Hall. Hall objects to the dissolution of the NRO by stating that the “technical challenges and requirements [of spaced based systems] make them more dissimilar than compatible with the non-space based technical collection assets.” He implies that the NSA and NIMA simply are not up to the technical task of managing space systems. Richelson points to others who say that the relationship between the NRO and the Secretary of Defense and the DCI is simply too good to break up. He also identifies areas other than SIGINT and IMINT that the NRO helps develop, such as human collection (HUMINT). Perhaps if the NRO was divided between the NSA and NIMA, the CIA and other HUMINT collection agencies dependent on NRO technologies would suffer.
The NRO was created as a joint CIA-Airforce operation. It is understandable that the CIA and the Department of Defense enjoy a close relationship through the NRO. However, the NRO has grown quickly, consuming billions of dollars annually to build and manage a vast array of
· Create a Separate Clandestine Service
Alongside the national collection organizations of SIGINT and IMINT, Odom contends there must be a separate intelligence program for national management of human collection and clandestine services, including those of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. Odom lumps all human collection (including military) assets into the CIA. A new organization, which he calls the “National Clandestine Service,” a component of the CIA, would manage all clandestine operations. Ideally, Odom would include all DOD paramilitary and clandestine operations in the NCS, including USSOCOM and Special Forces units. He calls for cooperation among the various agencies that utilize clandestine services, so that with coordination and planning, the most appropriate national assets will be utilized.
Richelson brushes the recommendation of a new clandestine service aside, calling it “pointless.” He agrees that the military and CIA could probably work well together, however, it would create an unnecessary level of bureaucracy that could hinder cooperative channels currently in use. Dr. Richelson submits that this new organization may give HUMINT a new start, but asks, “Exactly who would be hired to replace the present HUMINT personnel?” Richelson casts doubt on the suggestion of consolidating clandestine services by inferring that reorganization would not improve the current model.
Merging the clandestine and paramilitary operations of the CIA with those of the military sounds attractive at first. However, in reality, rarely does a president want to forfeit plausible deniability in a peacetime covert action operation by using uniformed military officers. Military oversight committees would be involved in any military engagement and what was once secret would be open. The CIA admittedly has bungled several operations in the past such as the assassination attempt on
Conclusion
Many solutions to the problems related to reforming intelligence exist. In light of the myriad changes that have occurred within the community since the printing of these books, it is difficult to apply all of the authors’ suggestions or comments directly to the current landscape. However, the observations and arguments of each still maintain a level of applicability to the topic of reform. While broad reforms and far-reaching changes may be in order, as General Odom suggests, it is best to wait and observe the results of the changes currently in effect.
The 9/11 Commission has made numerous recommendations for change within the community. The director of the FBI has overhauled its command structure, hiring thousand of intelligence analysts and updating its computer systems. Current reforms including the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President Bush signed into law on December 8 of that year, have dramatically affected reform. The newly created position of the DNI deserves time to develop and to work with the national managers. Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security is newly formed and is currently in the process of creating its own doctrine. Taxpayers would be short-changed if legislators do not wait to see the results of this investment before enacting major reforms. In the mean time, on-going evaluations and assessments should be continued, helping to make recommendations as the intelligence community progresses and develops.
However, creating fiscal authority for the NSA and the NGA to “purchase” services from the NRO is an issue that deserves serious consideration. A final evaluation date, as well, should be set for the current members of the intelligence community with definite benchmarks established as criterions for success. At that point, perhaps five to ten years from now, a decision can be made to continue with the current set of intelligence agencies and directors or to radically overhaul the entire community.
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