Policy makers, political and intelligence analysts have debated intelligence reform since its creation. Locating all intelligence responsibilities under one roof, for the purpose of better management and tighter fiscal control, has been a popular option among some. More convincing is the argument to allow various intelligence agencies autonomous operation and, rather than dissolve current organizations, create policy that will better coordinate intelligence activities and sharing of information. Intelligence responsibilities are better shared by multiple, specialized organizations who can better serve the end-user of intelligence rather than one central organization that would have difficulty managing and efficiently serving the customer.
Because it is difficult to define what an intelligence asset is, it would be nearly impossible to assign all intelligence assets and responsibilities to one organization. For example, antiaircraft weapons use radar guided guns and missiles to detect and steer the weapons toward its target.[1] On one hand, the radar is considered an intelligence asset under the radar intelligence discipline (RADINT) because it involves the use of friendly radar to detect and track foreign aircraft. On the other hand, the war fighter considers the radar an essential part of the weapon, because, without the radar, the weapon does not work. Further, nearly every naval vessel has some form of radar or sonar equipment (MASINT). Attempting to remove the responsibility of the radar or sonar portion of the weapon from the Department of Defense, and assign it to a central intelligence organization, while leaving the shooting end of the weapon intact, is impractical. What organization pays for the parts, design, training, staffing, repair and maintenance of intelligence assets directly controlled by the military?
Additionally, the
Further, while strategic intelligence assets could easily be transferred to a central intelligence organization, for reasons of expediency, tactical intelligence must remain in the hands of those who use it. Tactical intelligence is perishable time sensitive information, and requires immediate action, or the information becomes worthless. For example, a commander who needs imagery of the immediate area ahead of him can rely on military assets to quickly provide this information and even execute the destruction of the discovered enemy forces with air assets in under ten minutes.[3] Coordinating this level of efficiency through the bureaucracy of multiple organizations in such a short amount of time is unlikely because the request would enter a queue with other requests and then ranked on order of importance and finally levied. What non-military analyst can determine, among all the requests for intelligence, which is more important and deserves a faster reaction? The quick response of autonomous assets best suites the time sensitive needs of battlefield commanders.
Tactical intelligence is innately necessary for military success in the battlefield; those most directly and immediately affected by its use should control it. While civilizations thousands of miles away in air-conditioned offices may have the best intentions and professionalism, it is hard to imagine that they can perceive the degree of expediency required in tactical, life and death situations. Those who’s live are at risk must be able to trust the person providing the intelligence, the camaraderie and confidence found among military members helps to provide the confidence necessary to perform the task.
Mixed intelligence assets found in other specialized areas do not lend themselves to becoming part of the intelligence community. Aircraft designers in private corporations such as Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop Grumman study volumes of data concerning foreign air defense systems so that they can design, develop and produce
Whether the intelligence asset is in a private company, specialized intelligence agency or in the military, those assets are best left closest to those who utilize it. The shift in computers from operation of giant mainframes to the distributed, networked personal computer, each having its own processor, yet tied to the network, is analogous as to how the intelligence community should operate. As long as the Intelligence Community shares information over secured networks, the sharing of responsibility assets among a diverse community best serves the Community and the consumers of intelligence.
[1] Aircraft Survivability, accessed December 13, 2006 online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/1-113/AG.HTM
[2] AMC REGULATION 381-1, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 12 March 1990[3] Adam Herbert, Compressing the Kill Chain, Air Force Magazine March 2003, 50.
[4] Northrop Grumman Website, accessed December 12, 2006 online: http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/index.html
My StumbleUpon Page
Posts
